Wednesday, June 06, 2012

Ray Bradbury, Master of Science Fiction, Dies at 91

Ray Bradbury at a book signing in California in 1997.

Ray Bradbury, a master of science fiction whose imaginative and lyrical evocations of the future reflected both the optimism and the anxieties of his own postwar America, died on Tuesday in Los Angeles. He was 91.

His death was confirmed by his agent, Michael Congdon.

By many estimations Mr. Bradbury was the writer most responsible for bringing modern science fiction into the literary mainstream. His name would appear near the top of any list of major science-fiction writers of the 20th century, beside those of Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Robert A. Heinlein and the Polish author Stanislaw Lem. His books have been taught in schools and colleges, where many a reader has been introduced to them decades after they first appeared. Many have said they fired their own imaginations.

More than eight million copies of his books have been sold in 36 languages. They include the short-story collections “The Martian Chronicles,” “The Illustrated Man” and “The Golden Apples of the Sun,” and the novels “Fahrenheit 451” and “Something Wicked This Way Comes.”

Though none won a Pulitzer Prize, Mr. Bradbury received a Pulitzer citation in 2007 “for his distinguished, prolific and deeply influential career as an unmatched author of science fiction and fantasy.”His writing career stretched across 70 years. Only a week or so ago The New Yorker published an autobiographical essay by him in a double issue devoted to science fiction. There he recalled his “hungry imagination” as a boy in Illinois.

“It was one frenzy after one elation after one enthusiasm after one hysteria after another,” he wrote, noting, “You rarely have such fevers later in life that fill your entire day with emotion.”

Mr. Bradbury sold his first story to a magazine called Super Science Stories in his early 20s. By 30 he had made his reputation with “The Martian Chronicles,” a collection of thematically linked stories published in 1950.

The book celebrated the romance of space travel while condemning the social abuses that modern technology had made possible, and its impact was immediate and lasting. Critics who had dismissed science fiction as adolescent prattle praised “Chronicles” as stylishly written morality tales set in a future that seemed just around the corner.

Mr. Bradbury was hardly the first writer to represent science and technology as a mixed bag of blessings and abominations. The advent of the atomic bomb in 1945 left many Americans deeply ambivalent toward science. The same “super science” that had ended World War II now appeared to threaten the very existence of civilization. Science-fiction writers, who were accustomed to thinking about the role of science in society, had trenchant things to say about the nuclear threat.

But the audience for science fiction, published mostly in pulp magazines, was small and insignificant. Mr. Bradbury looked to a larger audience: the readers of mass-circulation magazines like Mademoiselle and The Saturday Evening Post. These readers had no patience for the technical jargon of the science fiction pulps. So he eliminated the jargon; he packaged his troubling speculations about the future in an appealing blend of cozy colloquialisms and poetic metaphors.

Though his books, particularly “The Martian Chronicles,” became a staple of high school and college English courses, Mr. Bradbury himself disdained formal education. He went so far as to attribute his success as a writer to his never having gone to college.

Instead, he read everything he could get his hands on: Edgar Allan Poe, Jules Verne, H. G. Wells, Edgar Rice Burroughs, Thomas Wolfe, Ernest Hemingway. He paid homage to them in 1971 in the essay “How Instead of Being Educated in College, I Was Graduated From Libraries.” (Late in life he took an active role in fund-raising efforts for public libraries in Southern California.)

Mr. Bradbury referred to himself as an “idea writer,” by which he meant something quite different from erudite or scholarly. “I have fun with ideas; I play with them,” he said. “ I’m not a serious person, and I don’t like serious people. I don’t see myself as a philosopher. That’s awfully boring.”

He added, “My goal is to entertain myself and others.”

He described his method of composition as “word association,” often triggered by a favorite line of poetry.

Mr. Bradbury’s passion for books found expression in his dystopian novel “Fahrenheit 451,” published in 1953. But he drew his primary inspiration from his childhood. He boasted that he had total recall of his earliest years, including the moment of his birth. Readers had no reason to doubt him.As for the protagonists of his stories, no matter how far they journeyed from home, they learned that they could never escape the past.

In his best stories and in his autobiographical novel, “Dandelion Wine” (1957), he gave voice to both the joys and fears of childhood, as well as its wonders.

“Dandelion Wine” begins before dawn on the first day of summer. From a window, Douglas Spaulding, 12, looks out upon his town, “covered over with darkness and at ease in bed.” He has a task to perform. “One night each week he was allowed to leave his father, his mother, and his younger brother Tom asleep in their small house next door and run here, up the dark spiral stairs to his grandparents’ cupola,” Mr. Bradbury writes, “and in this sorcerer’s tower sleep with thunders and visions, to wake before the crystal jingle of milk bottles and perform his ritual magic.

“He stood at the open window in the dark, took a deep breath and exhaled. The street lights, like candles on a black cake, went out. He exhaled again and again and the stars began to vanish.”

Now he begins to point his finger — “There, and there. Now over here, and here . . .” — and lights come on, and the town begins to stir.

“Clock alarms tinkled faintly. The courthouse clock boomed. Birds leaped from trees like a net thrown by his hand, singing. Douglas, conducting an orchestra, pointed to the eastern sky.

“The sun began to rise.

“He folded his arms and smiled a magician’s smile. Yes, sir, he thought, everyone jumps, everyone runs when I yell. It’ll be a fine season.

“He gave the town a last snap of his fingers.

“Doors slammed open; people stepped out.

“Summer 1928 began.”

Raymond Douglas Bradbury was born Aug. 22, 1920, in Waukegan, Ill., a small city whose Norman Rockwellesque charms he later reprised in his depiction of the fictional Green Town in “Dandelion Wine” and “Something Wicked This Way Comes,” and in the fatally alluring fantasies of the astronauts in “The Martian Chronicles.” His father, Leonard, a lineman with the electric company, numbered among his ancestors a woman who was tried as a witch in Salem, Mass.

An unathletic child who suffered from bad dreams, he relished the tales of the Brothers Grimm and the Oz stories of L. Frank Baum, which his mother, the former Esther Moberg, read to him. An aunt, Neva Bradbury, took him to his first stage plays, dressed him in monster costumes for Halloween and introduced him to Poe’s stories. He discovered the science-fiction pulps and began collecting the comic-strip adventures of Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon. The impetus to become a writer was supplied by a carnival magician named Mr. Electrico, who engaged the boy, then 12, in a conversation that touched on immortality.

In 1934 young Ray, his parents and his older brother, Leonard, moved to Los Angeles. (Another brother and a sister had died young.) Ray became a movie buff, sneaking into theaters as often as nine times a week, by his count. Encouraged by a high school English teacher and the professional writers he met at the Los Angeles chapter of the Science Fiction League, he began an enduring routine of turning out at least a thousand words a day on his typewriter.

His first big success came in 1947 with the short story “Homecoming,” narrated by a boy who feels like an outsider at a family reunion of witches, vampires and werewolves because he lacks supernatural powers. The story, plucked from the pile of unsolicited manuscripts at Mademoiselle by a young editor named Truman Capote, earned the 27-year-old Mr. Bradbury an O. Henry Award in 1947 as one of the best American short stories of the year.

With 26 other stories in a similar vein, “Homecoming” appeared in Mr. Bradbury’s first book, “Dark Carnival,” published by a small specialty press in 1947. That same year he married Marguerite Susan McClure, whom he had met in a Los Angeles bookstore.

Having written himself “down out of the attic,” as he later put it, Mr. Bradbury focused on science fiction. In a burst of creativity from 1946 to 1950, he produced most of the stories later collected in “The Martian Chronicles” and “The Illustrated Man” and the novella that formed the basis of “Fahrenheit 451.”

While science-fiction purists complained about Mr. Bradbury’s cavalier attitude toward scientific facts — he gave his fictional Mars an impossibly breathable atmosphere — the literary establishment waxed enthusiastic. The novelist Christopher Isherwood greeted Mr. Bradbury as “a very great and unusual talent,” and one of Mr. Bradbury’s personal heroes, Aldous Huxley, hailed him as a poet. In 1954, the National Institute of Arts and Letters honored Mr. Bradbury for “his contributions to American literature,” in particular the novel “Fahrenheit 451.”

“The Martian Chronicles” was pieced together from 26 stories, only a few of which were written with the book in mind. The patchwork narrative spans the years 1999 to 2026, depicting a series of expeditions to Mars and their aftermath. The native Martians, who can read minds, resist the early arrivals from Earth, but are finally no match for them and their advanced technology as the humans proceed to destroy the remains of an ancient civilization.

Parallels to the fate of American Indian cultures are pushed to the point of parody; the Martians are finally wiped out by an epidemic of chickenpox. When nuclear war destroys Earth, the descendants of the human colonists realize that they have become the Martians, with a second chance to create a just society.

“Fahrenheit 451” is perhaps his most successful book-length narrative. An indictment of authoritarianism, it portrays a book-burning America of the near future, its central character a so-called fireman, whose job is to light the bonfires. (The title refers to the temperature at which paper ignites.) Some critics compared it favorably to George Orwell’s “1984.” François Truffaut adapted the book for a well-received movie in 1966 starring Oskar Werner and Julie Christie.As Mr. Bradbury’s reputation grew, he found new outlets for his talents. He wrote the screenplay for John Huston’s 1956 film version of “Moby-Dick,” scripts for the television series “Alfred Hitchcock Presents” and collections of poetry and plays.

While Mr. Bradbury championed the space program as an adventure that humanity dared not shirk, he was content to restrict his own adventures to the realm of imagination. He lived in the same house in Los Angeles for more than 5o years, rearing four daughters with his wife, Marguerite, who died in 2003. For many years he refused to travel by plane, preferring trains, and he never learned to drive.

In 2004, President George W. Bush and the first lady, Laura Bush, presented Mr. Bradbury with the National Medal of Arts.

He is survived by his daughters, Susan Nixon, Ramona Ostergen, Bettina Karapetian and Alexandra Bradbury, and eight grandchildren.

Though the sedentary writing life appealed to him most, he was not reclusive. He developed a flair for public speaking and was widely sought after on the national lecture circuit. There he talked about his struggle to reconcile his mixed feelings about modern life, a theme that animated much of the fiction and won him such a large and sympathetic audience.

And he talked about the future, perhaps his favorite subject, describing how it both attracted and repelled him, leaving him with apprehension and hope.

NYT

Ray Bradbury, Master of Science Fiction, Dies at 91 - NYTimes.com

Ray Bradbury, Master of Science Fiction, Dies at 91 - NYTimes.com:

 "Ray Bradbury, a master of science fiction whose lyrical evocations of the future reflected both the optimism and the anxieties of his own postwar America, died on Tuesday in Los Angeles. He was 91."

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Tuesday, June 05, 2012

No Venus!


That's All Folks


11:11 PM CDT Almost Over


Taking Stock

At 10:42 PM CDT the transit is almost over. I walked towards Fermilab, that is how close I live from that Cathedral of Modern Science, around 4:00 PM CDT. I saw some big fish in a pond fighting for what to me looked like garbage, I kept walking towards the Village, where guests like me stay when they first get to the campus. There in a barn, they had setup a couple of telescopes to observe the Transit of Venus. I saw the beginning, and now I can see the end online from the NASA page set for this event. Venus is not out of the solar field yet.

My beloved Democratic Party lost in Wisconsin, I'm bombed out. My beloved students in Mexico are optimistic about stopping the party which ruled the country for over seventy years. After seeing what money can buy in Wisconsin, I'm not sure about the people winning down there.

On the other hand, I feel happy to have seen with my own eyes "The Transit of Venus"!

10:23 PM CDT Picture From NASA


What the Locusts Ate

One of the most troubling features of today’s global economic crisis is the lack of political leadership anywhere. No one has the courage to tell their people the truth. And the truth, alas, is that four of the pillars of today’s global economy — Europe, America, China and the Arab world — have, each in their own way, squandered huge dividends they enjoyed in recent decades, and now they have to dig out of their respective holes with fewer resources, less time and, almost certainly, more pain. There is no easy way out. But, as confronting these hard truths becomes unavoidable, I think we’re likely to see some wild, angry and destabilizing politics that could make the economic recovery even more difficult. Deep holes and weak leaders are a bad combination.

Let’s start with Europe. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal all enjoyed a “German dividend.” That is, they enjoyed German-level interest rates as members of the euro zone, even though they were not as productive or disciplined as German savers and workers. Instead of using that dividend to modernize their economies and make themselves more competitive and productive, they went on real estate or consumption binges that have badly weakened either their banks or national balance sheets. Now there is no more escaping the bill.

Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany decried this “missed opportunity” to overhaul their economies in a speech on Saturday, as reported by Bloomberg News. The lower borrowing rates that came with the introduction of the euro meant “countries like Italy became virtually on a par with Germany in terms of interest rates,” she said. “The freedom created by this situation wasn’t exploited to improve long-term competitiveness. Instead, the time was used to spend too much money in consumption and too little time in tackling reforms.”

Bloomberg quoted Nikolaus Blome, the Bild newspaper’s chief political columnist, as saying that the Greek state “must be rebuilt, like in a developing nation.” “Someone among the euro-zone leaders must finally tell the Greeks the truth: this fresh start can only be achieved with a radical first step,” he said. “And that means leaving the euro.”

The Arab world had 50 years of autocratic rule in which leaders from Libya to Tunisia to Egypt to Syria to Yemen could have gradually ordered reforms from the top down. The military dictators in South Korea and Taiwan used their power surpluses to build export-led economies and educate all their people, creating huge middle classes that gradually took power democratically. But the Arab leaders used their surpluses of power and wealth to ignore the U.N.’s Arab Human Development Report in 2002, which said they urgently needed to overcome their deficits of freedom, knowledge and women’s empowerment. Instead, they enriched a small slice of their populations and distracted the rest with shiny objects, like Israel or populist Nasserism. Now the Arabs have to dig out of this deep hole with fractured political systems and huge youth populations. Who will tell their people that building competitive economies with modern schools will be a huge challenge? The turmoil on the streets of Egypt today is a taste of things to come.

To its credit, China used its huge export dividend to build 21st-century infrastructure and to educate its people, creating a giant middle class. But the current Chinese leadership has not used this surging economic growth to also introduce gradual political reform. Corruption is as bad as ever, institutionalized transparency and rule of law remain weak and consensual politics nonexistent. If growth slows and incomes widen further, more and more steam will build up in that system with no outlet, which is surely one reason Wen Jiabao, China’s retiring prime minister, warned in March that his country had reached “a critical stage.”

Without real “political reform,” Wen added, “it’s impossible for China to fully institute economic reform and the gains we have made in these areas may be lost, and new problems ... will not be fundamentally resolved, and such historical tragedies as the Cultural Revolution may happen again in China.” Yikes.

As for America, in the 1990s we enjoyed a peace dividend, a dot-com dividend and a low-oil-price dividend, which combined to sharply reduce the federal deficit. But 9/11, two wars accompanied by tax cuts, not tax increases, a Medicare prescription drug plan and a necessary bailout to prevent a potential depression put us more in debt than ever.

So for Europe, the Arabs, China and America, in different ways, these have been the years the locusts ate. Getting healthy again will be wrenching for all of us. If I were President Obama, I’d focus my entire campaign now on an effort to reforge a “grand bargain”with Republicans based on a near-term infrastructure stimulus tied with a Simpson-Bowles long-term fiscal rebalancing. At a minimum, it would show that Obama has a sensible plan to fix the economy — which is what people want most from the president — and many in business would surely support it. We cannot wait until January to do serious policy making again. We, and the world, need America to be a rock of stability — now.

NYT

Is Pleasure a Sin? - NYTimes.com

Is Pleasure a Sin? - NYTimes.com:

 "It’s hard to say what is weirder:"

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Hawaii Feed

NASA

Slooh Space Camera Transit of Venus

From Australia


Transit of Venus


Jake: Hanging out with a teenage Einstein - 60 Minutes Overtime - CBS News

Jake: Hanging out with a teenage Einstein - 60 Minutes Overtime - CBS News:

"At 13, Jake Barnett has accomplished a lot. He is a college sophomore on full scholarship, he does paid scientific research on the side, and now, he's the subject of a profile on "60 Minutes.""

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Jan Karski in Democracy Now!

Mexico to witness transit of Venus, as Mayans did before - CSMonitor.com

Mexico to witness transit of Venus, as Mayans did before - CSMonitor.com:

 "The Western Hemisphere will be able to view Venus crossing the sun this evening, a last-in-a-lifetime opportunity. In Mexico events are scheduled today across the capital."

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Perpetual Babe/Jean Grey

Venus NYT


Monday, June 04, 2012

Transit of Venus


Venus Transit - Wolfram|Alpha

Venus Transit - Wolfram|Alpha:

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NASA Channel

Here

Learning From Celestial Beauty - NYTimes.com

Learning From Celestial Beauty - NYTimes.com:

 "VENUS slides between us and the Sun today, an exceedingly rare spectacle that scientists hope will expand their understanding of our solar system and refine their inquiries about distant planets."

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Panic on Top?

The rumbles from Wall Street are not reassuring, read below.

Goldman Sachs Cuts a Little Deeper - NYTimes.com

Goldman Sachs Cuts a Little Deeper - NYTimes.com:

 "The layoffs are largely economic; the firm like the rest of Wall Street is confronting a number of challenges to growth, in part because of Europe’s debt woes. Already, analysts have begun ratcheting down their second-quarter earnings estimates for the banks."

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Big Data’s Parallel Universe Brings Fears, and a Thrill - NYTimes.com

Big Data’s Parallel Universe Brings Fears, and a Thrill - NYTimes.com:

 "Not long ago, a woman in Tacoma, Wash., received a suggestion from Facebook that she “friend” another woman. She didn’t know the other woman, but she followed through, as many of us have, innocently laying our cookie-crumb trails through cyberspace, only to get a surprise."

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Tony Lawson: The nature of heterodox economics

I found this work by a Cambridge economics professor. The link is here.

Mr. Soros led to a discussion in which this scientist was mentioned.

As a physicist interested in Complex Systems, I find the video below very interesting.

My conclusion is that computers, and new scientific paradigms are needed. You can read some of my very, very preliminary, thoughts in  this blog Eduardo Cantoral.

George Soros at INET

Lost Decades

First Latin America (80s), second Japan (90s), third North America (00s), and fourth Europe (10s).

I wonder if after a lost decade there is recovery?

 If I understand Soros, and Krugman correctly, there is life after death.

I wonder whether, and in what order, we'll see these recoveries?

Or is this The End?

Soros, Krugman, Popper, and the Lost Decade

After I read George Soros' piece that Paul Krugman recommended; I was reminded of a lost decade in my life. Karl Popper emphasized the Open Society, and now I know that I was the victim of Extractive Institutions in the country I was born. Mexico is not an Open Society.

Mexico has been ruled by strong men since before Hernan Cortes set foot there. Mexicans have lost great men fighting against injustices, I lost ten years of my life. The Latin American Lost Decade   was supposed to be my glorious first ten years of independent scientific work. When I was at MIT in the early eighties; professor Hung Cheng had a visitor from mainland China, who cried remembering how he lost his most important years to the Cultural Revolution.

I am not bitter; but I have to know where I am coming from.

Lost Decade (Latin America) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Lost Decade (Latin America) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:

"The lost decade is a reference to the economic stagnation experienced by Latin America during the 1980s, when there was a sharp decline in industrial production and a lower growth of the economy as a whole.[1]"

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Dual Citizenship?

I am reading the Karzai saga in the NYT, (below). I know that in South Texas and Northeastern Mexico, there is a similar process going on. Some people take advantage of every opportunity, unlike me.

Are the Karzais Afghans?

Are the Salinas Mexicans?

You do your own research, and reach your own conclusions. I am happy to pose the question.

Karzai Family Moves to Protect Its Privilege - NYTimes.com

Karzai Family Moves to Protect Its Privilege - NYTimes.com:

 "WASHINGTON — With the end in sight for Hamid Karzai’s days in office as Afghanistan’s president, members of his family are trying to protect their status, weighing how to hold on to power while secretly fighting among themselves for control of the fortune they have amassed in the last decade."

'via Blog this'

How Do Student Movements Start in Mexico?

I have seen two student movements in my lifetime in Mexico. Summer and Fall 1968, and Spring 2012.

The first started in La Ciudadela, where, after a sports event, students from vocational schools numbers 2 and 5, fought against Isaac Ochoterena high school students. The city police hurt them, and even went inside the school at La Ciudadela plaza, where  instructors were beaten as well. The second movement started at Universidad Iberoamericana, where students confronted the presidential candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Enrique Peña Nieto, who completely failed to face their protest.

In both cases the Mexican media blatantly lied about the events, and the students got PRETTY upset.

There is a big difference now though, students OWN the Internet.

Go kids, don't let these assholes bug you!

Cultural Phenomenon!

I have an eerie feeling reading side by side, The New York Times and La Jornada.

I participated in the 1968 student movement in Mexico City. I was a young engineering student at Escuela Superior de Ingeniería Mecánica y Eléctrica, ESIME. We went to Cerro del Chiquihuite to proselytize. We printed pamphlets with mimeographs.
El Chiquihuite From ESIME
 Now our children from Australia to Taxco, go to twitter with the hashtag #YoSoy132, and voilà : The whole world is listening and watching!

I predict that Paul Krugman, will become a cultural phenomenon: Why? Because he is brilliant and courageous, and both, The New York Times, and La Jornada, will have to listen.

¡Qué Viva Krugman!

Soros on the Euro - NYTimes.com

Soros on the Euro - NYTimes.com:

"His speech is getting a lot of attention, and rightly so. It’s not so different from what many of us have been saying, but given the source — and, to be fair, the historical breadth of his perspective — I can see why it’s getting people to pay attention in a way they hadn’t before."

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¡Acabad Ya Con Esta Crisis!

Karl Popper - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Karl Popper - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:

 "Sir Karl Raimund Popper, CH FRS[1] FBA (28 July 1902 – 17 September 1994) was an Austro-British[2] philosopher and professor at the London School of Economics.[3] He is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century;[4][5] he also wrote extensively on social and political philosophy."

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Remarks at the Festival of Economics, Trento Italy | George Soros

Ever since the Crash of 2008 there has been a widespread recognition, both among economists and the general public, that economic theory has failed. But there is no consensus on the causes and the extent of that failure.

I believe that the failure is more profound than generally recognized. It goes back to the foundations of economic theory. Economics tried to model itself on Newtonian physics. It sought to establish universally and timelessly valid laws governing reality. But economics is a social science and there is a fundamental difference between the natural and social sciences. Social phenomena have thinking participants who base their decisions on imperfect knowledge. That is what economic theory has tried to ignore.

Scientific method needs an independent criterion, by which the truth or validity of its theories can be judged. Natural phenomena constitute such a criterion; social phenomena do not. That is because natural phenomena consist of facts that unfold independently of any statements that relate to them. The facts then serve as objective evidence by which the validity of scientific theories can be judged. That has enabled natural science to produce amazing results.

Social events, by contrast, have thinking participants who have a will of their own.  They are not detached observers but engaged decision makers whose decisions greatly influence the course of events. Therefore the events do not constitute an independent criterion by which participants can decide whether their views are valid. In the absence of an independent criterion people have to base their decisions not on knowledge but on an inherently biased and to greater or lesser extent distorted interpretation of reality. Their lack of perfect knowledge or fallibility introduces an element of indeterminacy into the course of events that is absent when the events relate to the behavior of inanimate objects. The resulting uncertainty hinders the social sciences in producing laws similar to Newton’s physics.

Economics, which became the most influential of the social sciences, sought to remove this handicap by taking an axiomatic approach similar to Euclid’s geometry. But Euclid’s axioms closely resembled reality while the theory of rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis became far removed from it. Up to a point the axiomatic approach worked. For instance, the theory of perfect competition postulated perfect knowledge. But the postulate worked only as long as it was applied to the exchange of physical goods. When it came to production, as distinct from exchange, or to the use of money and credit, the postulate became untenable because the participants’ decisions involved the future and the future cannot be known until it has actually occurred.

I am not well qualified to criticize the theory of rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis because as a market participant I considered them so unrealistic that I never bothered to study them. That is an indictment in itself but I shall leave a detailed critique of these theories to others.

Instead, I should like to put before you a radically different approach to financial markets. It was inspired by Karl Popper who taught me that people’s interpretation of reality never quite corresponds to reality itself. This led me to study the relationship between the two. I found a two-way connection between the participants’ thinking and the situations in which they participate. On the one hand people seek to understand the situation; that is the cognitive function. On the other, they seek to make an impact on the situation; I call that the causative or manipulative function. The two functions connect the thinking agents and the situations in which they participate in opposite directions. In the cognitive function the situation is supposed to determine the participants’ views; in the causative function the participants’ views are supposed to determine the outcome. When both functions are at work at the same time they interfere with each other. The two functions form a circular relationship or feedback loop. I call that feedback loop reflexivity. In a reflexive situation the participants’ views cannot correspond to reality because reality is not something independently given; it is contingent on the participants’ views and decisions. The decisions, in turn, cannot be based on knowledge alone; they must contain some bias or guess work about the future because the future is contingent on the participants’ decisions.

Fallibility and reflexivity are tied together like Siamese twins. Without fallibility there would be no reflexivity – although the opposite is not the case: people’s understanding would be imperfect even in the absence of reflexivity. Of the two twins, fallibility is the first born. Together, they ensure both a divergence between the participants’ view of reality and the actual state of affairs and a divergence between the participants’ expectations and the actual outcome.

Obviously, I did not discover reflexivity. Others had recognized it before me, often under a different name. Robert Merton wrote about self-fulfilling prophecies and the bandwagon effect, Keynes compared financial markets to a beauty contest where the participants had to guess who would be the most popular choice. But starting from fallibility and reflexivity I focused on a problem area, namely the role of misconceptions and misunderstandings in shaping the course of events that mainstream economics tried to ignore. This has made my interpretation of reality more realistic than the prevailing paradigm.

Among other things, I developed a model of a boom-bust process or bubble which is endogenous to financial markets, not the result of external shocks. According to my theory, financial bubbles are not a purely psychological phenomenon.  They have two components: a trend that prevails in reality and a misinterpretation of that trend. A bubble can develop when the feedback is initially positive in the sense that both the trend and its biased interpretation are mutually reinforced. Eventually the gap between the trend and its biased interpretation grows so wide that it becomes unsustainable. After a twilight period both the bias and the trend are reversed and reinforce each other in the opposite direction. Bubbles are usually asymmetric in shape: booms develop slowly but the bust tends to be sudden and devastating. That is due to the use of leverage: price declines precipitate the forced liquidation of leveraged positions.

Well-formed financial bubbles always follow this pattern but the magnitude and duration of each phase is unpredictable. Moreover the process can be aborted at any stage so that well-formed financial bubbles occur rather infrequently.

At any moment of time there are myriads of feedback loops at work, some of which are positive, others negative. They interact with each other, producing the irregular price patterns that prevail most of the time; but on the rare occasions that bubbles develop to their full potential they tend to overshadow all other influences.

According to my theory financial markets may just as soon produce bubbles as tend toward equilibrium. Since bubbles disrupt financial markets, history has been punctuated by financial crises. Each crisis provoked a regulatory response. That is how central banking and financial regulations have evolved, in step with the markets themselves. Bubbles occur only intermittently but the interplay between markets and regulators is ongoing. Since both market participants and regulators act on the basis of imperfect knowledge the interplay between them is reflexive. Moreover reflexivity and fallibility are not confined to the financial markets; they also characterize other spheres of social life, particularly politics. Indeed, in light of the ongoing interaction between markets and regulators it is quite misleading to study financial markets in isolation. Behind the invisible hand of the market lies the visible hand of politics. Instead of pursuing timeless laws and models we ought to study events in their time bound context.

My interpretation of financial markets differs from the prevailing paradigm in many ways. I emphasize the role of misunderstandings and misconceptions in shaping the course of history. And I treat bubbles as largely unpredictable. The direction and its eventual reversal are predictable; the magnitude and duration of the various phases is not. I contend that taking fallibility as the starting point makes my conceptual framework more realistic. But at a price: the idea that laws or models of universal validity can predict the future must be abandoned.

Until recently, my interpretation of financial markets was either ignored or dismissed by academic economists. All this has changed since the crash of 2008. Reflexivity became recognized but, with the exception of Imperfect Knowledge Economics, the foundations of economic theory have not been subjected to the profound rethinking that I consider necessary. Reflexivity has been accommodated by speaking of multiple equilibria instead of a single one. But that is not enough. The fallibility of market participants, regulators, and economists must also be recognized.  A truly dynamic situation cannot be understood by studying multiple equilibria.  We need to study the process of change.

The euro crisis is particularly instructive in this regard. It demonstrates the role of misconceptions and a lack of understanding in shaping the course of history. The authorities didn’t understand the nature of the euro crisis; they thought it is a fiscal problem while it is more of a banking problem and a problem of competitiveness. And they applied the wrong remedy: you cannot reduce the debt burden by shrinking the economy, only by growing your way out of it. The crisis is still growing because of a failure to understand the dynamics of social change; policy measures that could have worked at one point in time were no longer sufficient by the time they were applied.

Since the euro crisis is currently exerting an overwhelming influence on the global economy I shall devote the rest of my talk to it. I must start with a warning: the discussion will take us beyond the confines of economic theory into politics and the dynamics of social change. But my conceptual framework based on the twin pillars of fallibility and reflexivity still applies. Reflexivity doesn’t always manifest itself in the form of bubbles. The reflexive interplay between imperfect markets and imperfect authorities goes on all the time while bubbles occur only infrequently. This is a rare occasion when the interaction exerts such a large influence that it casts its shadow on the global economy. How could this happen? My answer is that there is a bubble involved, after all, but it is not a financial but a political one. It relates to the political evolution of the European Union and it has led me to the conclusion that the euro crisis threatens to destroy the European Union. Let me explain.

I contend that the European Union itself is like a bubble. In the boom phase the EU was what the psychoanalyst David Tuckett calls a “fantastic object” – unreal but immensely attractive. The EU was the embodiment of an open society –an association of nations founded on the principles of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in which no nation or nationality would have a dominant position. 

The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They recognized that perfection is unattainable; so they set limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilized the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step. The process fed on its own success, very much like a financial bubble. That is how the Coal and Steel Community was gradually transformed into the European Union, step by step.

Germany used to be in the forefront of the effort. When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany’s leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were willing to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it.  When it came to bargaining they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement.  At that time, German statesmen used to assert that Germany has no independent foreign policy, only a European one.

The process culminated with the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro. It was followed by a period of stagnation which, after the crash of 2008, turned into a process of disintegration. The first step was taken by Germany when, after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Angela Merkel declared that the virtual guarantee extended to other financial institutions should come from each country acting separately, not by Europe acting jointly. It took financial markets more than a year to realize the implication of that declaration, showing that they are not perfect.

The Maastricht Treaty was fundamentally flawed, demonstrating the fallibility of the authorities. Its main weakness was well known to its architects: it established a monetary union without a political union. The architects believed however, that when the need arose the political will could be generated to take the necessary steps towards a political union.

But the euro also had some other defects of which the architects were unaware and which are not fully understood even today. In retrospect it is now clear that the main source of trouble is that the member states of the euro have surrendered to the European Central Bank their rights to create fiat money. They did not realize what that entails – and neither did the European authorities. When the euro was introduced the regulators allowed banks to buy unlimited amounts of government bonds without setting aside any equity capital; and the central bank accepted all government bonds at its discount window on equal terms. Commercial banks found it advantageous to accumulate the bonds of the weaker euro members in order to earn a few extra basis points. That is what caused interest rates to converge which in turn caused competitiveness to diverge. Germany, struggling with the burdens of reunification, undertook structural reforms and became more competitive. Other countries enjoyed housing and consumption booms on the back of cheap credit, making them less competitive. Then came the crash of 2008 which created conditions that were far removed from those prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty. Many governments had to shift bank liabilities on to their own balance sheets and engage in massive deficit spending. These countries found themselves in the position of a third world country that had become heavily indebted in a currency that it did not control. Due to the divergence in economic performance Europe became divided between creditor and debtor countries. This is having far reaching political implications to which I will revert.

It took some time for the financial markets to discover that government bonds which had been considered riskless are subject to speculative attack and may actually default; but when they did, risk premiums rose dramatically. This rendered commercial banks whose balance sheets were loaded with those bonds potentially insolvent. And that constituted the two main components of the problem confronting us today: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis which are closely interlinked.

The eurozone is now repeating what had often happened in the global financial system. There is a close parallel between the euro crisis and the international banking crisis that erupted in 1982. Then the international financial authorities did whatever was necessary to protect the banking system: they inflicted hardship on the periphery in order to protect the center. Now Germany and the other creditor countries are unknowingly playing the same role. The details differ but the idea is the same: the creditors are in effect shifting the burden of adjustment on to the debtor countries and avoiding their own responsibility for the imbalances. Interestingly, the terms “center” and “periphery” have crept into usage almost unnoticed. Just as in the 1980’s all the blame and burden is falling on the “periphery” and the responsibility of the “center” has never been properly acknowledged.  Yet in the euro crisis the responsibility of the center is even greater than it was in 1982. The “center” is responsible for designing a flawed system, enacting flawed treaties, pursuing flawed policies and always doing too little too late. In the 1980’s Latin America suffered a lost decade; a similar fate now awaits Europe. That is the responsibility that Germany and the other creditor countries need to acknowledge. But there is no sign of this happening.

The European authorities had little understanding of what was happening. They were prepared to deal with fiscal problems but only Greece qualified as a fiscal crisis; the rest of Europe suffered from a banking crisis and a divergence in competitiveness which gave rise to a balance of payments crisis. The authorities did not even understand the nature of the problem, let alone see a solution. So they tried to buy time.

Usually that works. Financial panics subside and the authorities realize a profit on their intervention. But not this time because the financial problems were reinforced by a process of political disintegration. While the European Union was being created, the leadership was in the forefront of further integration; but after the outbreak of the financial crisis the authorities became wedded to preserving the status quo. This has forced all those who consider the status quo unsustainable or intolerable into an anti-European posture. That is the political dynamic that makes the disintegration of the European Union just as self-reinforcing as its creation has been.  That is the political bubble I was talking about.

At the onset of the crisis a breakup of the euro was inconceivable: the assets and liabilities denominated in a common currency were so intermingled that a breakup would have led to an uncontrollable meltdown. But as the crisis progressed the financial system has been progressively reordered along national lines. This trend has gathered momentum in recent months. The Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) undertaken by the European Central Bank enabled Spanish and Italian banks to engage in a very profitable and low risk arbitrage by buying the bonds of their own countries. And other investors have been actively divesting themselves of the sovereign debt of the periphery countries.

If this continued for a few more years a break-up of the euro would become possible without a meltdown – the omelet could be unscrambled – but it would leave the central banks of the creditor countries with large claims against the central banks of the debtor countries which would be difficult to collect. This is due to an arcane problem in the euro clearing system called Target2. In contrast to the clearing system of the Federal Reserve, which is settled annually, Target2 accumulates the imbalances. This did not create a problem as long as the interbank system was functioning because the banks settled the imbalances themselves through the interbank market. But the interbank market has not functioned properly since 2007 and the banks relied increasingly on the Target system. And since the summer of 2011 there has been increasing capital flight from the weaker countries. So the imbalances grew exponentially. By the end of March this year the Bundesbank had claims of some 660 billion euros against the central banks of the periphery countries.

The Bundesbank has become aware of the potential danger. It is now engaged in a campaign against the indefinite expansion of the money supply and it has started taking measures to limit the losses it would sustain in case of a breakup. This is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once the Bundesbank starts guarding against a breakup everybody will have to do the same.

This is already happening. Financial institutions are increasingly reordering their European exposure along national lines just in case the region splits apart. Banks give preference to shedding assets outside their national borders and risk managers try to match assets and liabilities within national borders rather than within the eurozone as a whole. The indirect effect of this asset-liability matching is to reinforce the deleveraging process and to reduce the availability of credit, particularly to the small and medium enterprises which are the main source of employment.

So the crisis is getting ever deeper. Tensions in financial markets have risen to new highs as shown by the historic low yield on Bunds. Even more telling is the fact that the yield on British 10 year bonds has never been lower in its 300 year history while the risk premium on Spanish bonds is at a new high.

The real economy of the eurozone is declining while Germany is still booming. This means that the divergence is getting wider. The political and social dynamics are also working toward disintegration. Public opinion as expressed in recent election results is increasingly opposed to austerity and this trend is likely to grow until the policy is reversed. So something has to give.

In my judgment the authorities have a three months’ window during which they could still correct their mistakes and reverse the current trends. By the authorities I mean mainly the German government and the Bundesbank because in a crisis the creditors are in the driver’s seat and nothing can be done without German support.

I expect that the Greek public will be sufficiently frightened by the prospect of expulsion from the European Union that it will give a narrow majority of seats to a coalition that is ready to abide by the current agreement. But no government can meet the conditions so that the Greek crisis is liable to come to a climax in the fall. By that time the German economy will also be weakening so that Chancellor Merkel will find it even more difficult than today to persuade the German public to accept any additional European responsibilities. That is what creates a three months’ window.

Correcting the mistakes and reversing the trend would require some extraordinary policy measures to bring conditions back closer to normal, and bring relief to the financial markets and the banking system. These measures must, however, conform to the existing treaties. The treaties could then be revised in a calmer atmosphere so that the current imbalances will not recur. It is difficult but not impossible to design some extraordinary measures that would meet these tough requirements. They would have to tackle simultaneously the banking problem and the problem of excessive government debt, because these problems are interlinked. Addressing one without the other, as in the past, will not work.

Banks need a European deposit insurance scheme in order to stem the capital flight. They also need direct financing by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which has to go hand-in-hand with eurozone-wide supervision and regulation. The heavily indebted countries need relief on their financing costs. There are various ways to provide it but they all need the active support of the Bundesbank and the German government.

That is where the blockage is. The authorities are working feverishly to come up with a set of proposals in time for the European summit at the end of this month. Based on the current newspaper reports the measures they will propose will cover all the bases I mentioned but they will offer only the minimum on which the various parties can agree while what is needed is a convincing commitment to reverse the trend. That means the measures will again offer some temporary relief but the trends will continue. But we are at an inflection point.  After the expiration of the three months’ window the markets will continue to demand more but the authorities will not be able to meet their demands.

It is impossible to predict the eventual outcome. As mentioned before, the gradual reordering of the financial system along national lines could make an orderly breakup of the euro possible in a few years’ time and, if it were not for the social and political dynamics, one could imagine a common market without a common currency. But the trends are clearly non-linear and an earlier breakup is bound to be disorderly. It would almost certainly lead to a collapse of the Schengen Treaty, the common market, and the European Union itself. (It should be remembered that there is an exit mechanism for the European Union but not for the euro.) Unenforceable claims and unsettled grievances would leave Europe worse off than it was at the outset when the project of a united Europe was conceived.

But the likelihood is that the euro will survive because a breakup would be devastating not only for the periphery but also for Germany. It would leave Germany with large unenforceable claims against the periphery countries. The Bundesbank alone will have over a trillion euros of claims arising out of Target2 by the end of this year, in addition to all the intergovernmental obligations. And a return to the Deutschemark would likely price Germany out of its export markets – not to mention the political consequences. So Germany is likely to do what is necessary to preserve the euro – but nothing more. That would result in a eurozone dominated by Germany in which the divergence between the creditor and debtor countries would continue to widen and the periphery would turn into permanently depressed areas in need of constant transfer of payments. That would turn the European Union into something very different from what it was when it was a “fantastic object” that fired peoples imagination. It would be a German empire with the periphery as the hinterland.

I believe most of us would find that objectionable but I have a great deal of sympathy with Germany in its present predicament. The German public cannot understand why a policy of structural reforms and fiscal austerity that worked for Germany a decade ago will not work Europe today. Germany then could enjoy an export led recovery but the eurozone today is caught in a deflationary debt trap. The German public does not see any deflation at home; on the contrary, wages are rising and there are vacancies for skilled jobs which are eagerly snapped up by immigrants from other European countries. Reluctance to invest abroad and the influx of flight capital are fueling a real estate boom. Exports may be slowing but employment is still rising. In these circumstances it would require an extraordinary effort by the German government to convince the German public to embrace the extraordinary measures that would be necessary to reverse the current trend. And they have only a three months’ window in which to do it.

We need to do whatever we can to convince Germany to show leadership and preserve the European Union as the fantastic object that it used to be. The future of Europe depends on it.

Taken From George Soros

Remarks at the Festival of Economics, Trento Italy | George Soros

Remarks at the Festival of Economics, Trento Italy | George Soros:

 "Ever since the Crash of 2008 there has been a widespread recognition, both among economists and the general public, that economic theory has failed. But there is no consensus on the causes and the extent of that failure."

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Karzai Family Moves to Protect Its Privilege - NYTimes.com

Karzai Family Moves to Protect Its Privilege - NYTimes.com:

 "WASHINGTON — With the end in sight for Hamid Karzai’s days in office as Afghanistan’s president, members of his family are trying to protect their status, weighing how to hold on to power while secretly fighting among themselves for control of the fortune they have amassed in the last decade."

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Curse Words

Sunday, June 03, 2012

Philosophy's Western Bias

By JUSTIN E. H. SMITH

The Stone is a forum for contemporary philosophers on issues both timely and timeless.

There is much talk in academic philosophy about the need to open up the discipline to so-called non-Western traditions and perspectives, both through changes to the curriculum and also within the demographics of philosophy departments themselves. These two aspects are seen as connected: it is thought that greater representation of non-Western philosophy will help to bring about greater diversity among the women and men who make up the philosophical community.

The goal of making academic philosophy more inclusive has so far been a failure.

When I teach classical Indian philosophy, or advocate teaching it, for example, I often hear in response that doing so provides a service to the university community, and to the student body, insofar as it enhances the diversity of the philosophy curriculum, and makes the curriculum representative of a wider portion of the student body. But what I’m teaching are topics such as 5th-century Indian theories of logical inference, or the concept of qualitative atomism in classical Buddhism: material that is sufficiently obscure that no student, of any background, should be expected at the outset to recognize him or herself in it.

The goal of reflecting the diversity of our own society by expanding the curriculum to include non-European traditions has so far been a tremendous failure. And it has failed for at least two reasons. One is that non-Western philosophy is typically represented in philosophy curricula in a merely token way. Western philosophy is always the unmarked category, the standard in relation to which non-Western philosophy provides a useful contrast. Non-Western philosophy is not approached on its own terms, and thus philosophy remains, implicitly and by default, Western. Second, non-Western philosophy, when it does appear in curricula, is treated in a methodologically and philosophically unsound way: it is crudely supposed to be wholly indigenous to the cultures that produce it and to be fundamentally different than Western philosophy in areas like its valuation of reason or its dependence on myth and religion. In this way, non-Western philosophy remains fundamentally “other.”

One good way to begin to correct this problem would be to stop describing it as “non-Western,” but instead to be explicit about which geographical region, or which tradition, we are discussing: Kashmir Shaivism, for example, or Chinese Mohist logic, just as we would speak of German Aristotelian Scholasticism or American Pragmatism, without, ordinarily, bothering to specify that these are both “Western.”’ Imagine, for comparison, the righteous vigor with which we would condemn the academic subfield of agricultural history if 95 percent of all the research in this field were devoted to irrigation techniques in Southeast Asia, while the remaining 5 percent was required to package itself as the study of “non-Southeast Asian irrigation techniques.” This sounds absurd, and it is, but it really is no more so than when the small minority of scholars who work on say, Indian or Chinese philosophy, are obligated to present their research as having something to do with “non-Western philosophy” for the simple reason that it does not come from Northwest Eurasia.

An alternative approach to the history of philosophy — one that takes the aim of opening up the discipline seriously — would treat both Western and non-Western philosophy as the regional inflections of a global phenomenon.

When we say “West” we mean, ordinarily, Europe, along with its recent extension into North America. Europe is, literally, a peninsula of Eurasia, comparable roughly in size, cultural diversity and civilizational antiquity to the Indian subcontinent. Certain significant things happened first in Europe rather than elsewhere, such as industrialization; other important things first appeared outside of Europe, such as movable type. Now it is of course very difficult to define “philosophy,” but if we think of it broadly as systematic reflection on the nature of reality and on humanity’s place in that reality, then it is clear that Europe can make no special claim to be the home of philosophy.

In Iran, there is an emphasis on Islamic philosophy. Are they ‘wrong’?

What Europe does claim is a certain tradition reaching back to Greek antiquity. But even that claim is in question. The “Greek miracle” is in the end only a historiographical artifact, a result of our habit of beginning our histories when and where we do, for there was always influence from neighboring civilizations. But whatever the complexities of the world in which Plato wrote, it is at least true that the subsequent tradition that would come to be called “Western” or “European” — with of course a long detour through Islamic Spain, North Africa, Persia and Central Asia, without which the Greek tradition would surely have died out — really does constitute, as Alfred North Whitehead put it, a “series of footnotes to Plato.” Seen from this perspective, the only reason to take European philosophy as the default tradition for our curricula is that it just happens to be, for contingent historical reasons, our tradition.

But nearly every subject taught in Western universities developed in large part out of the Western intellectual tradition, yet this legacy has not prevented any discipline other than philosophy from aspiring to an objective, global and, I dare say, scientific perspective on its object of study, free of the idea that the European instance of it is something special in the history of humanity.

Now, a large part of the difficulty of thinking of Western philosophy as one tradition among others has to do with the fact that many if not most of its practitioners reject the idea that what they do is essentially bound to the discipline’s past. Philosophy is conceived on the model of the sciences, which are indeed free to ignore disproven theories from long ago, and thus to ignore not just, say, ancient China, but early modern Europe as well. In this respect the history of ancient Chinese philosophy is doubly peripheral, not just because of Eurocentrism, but also because of presentism, a lack of interest in history in general. This stems from the fact that philosophy, modeling itself after the sciences, believes it is closer to the truth than it was in the past, and that if a theory is not true there is little reason to spend much time on it.

I will not argue against this view of philosophy here. But I will point out that it does make the current situation of philosophy, when considered from a global perspective, fairly difficult to comprehend. Chinese and American polymer researchers speak exactly the same language when they are doing their job, and there was never any danger that A. Q. Khan’s development of Pakistan’s nuclear program would be slowed down by cultural differences in the understanding of uranium enrichment. With philosophy, however, it is plainly a different story.

Related
More From The Stone

Read previous contributions to this series.

In the developing world in particular, the version of philosophy put forward — be it French or Anglo-American in character, or entirely home-grown — has very much to do with the country’s broader project of national identity construction. In Iran, Islamic philosophy is given priority; in Turkey, at least until recently, there was scarcely any mention of local or regional traditions in the university philosophy curriculum, but only a fervent devotion to a vision of philosophy principally concerned with analysis of the language and methodology of science. Now one can’t say — or at least I’m not prepared to say — that Iran is doing things wrong, as one might if they were to teach medieval Islamic alchemy in their chemistry departments. The difference is that philosophy is simply not like science; it is much more intricately wrapped up in cultural legacies (some have argued that science is just another cultural practice too, but I’m not prepared to say that either). Much of the difficulty of taking a rigorous and serious approach to the teaching and study of non-Western philosophy in Western philosophy departments is that many philosophers remain attached to the article of faith that philosophy is something independent of culture.

G. W. Leibniz, writing in the early 18th century on the future course of Sino-European relations, suggested evocatively that “the commerce of light,” which is to say of illumination, or knowledge, always piggy-backs on the commerce of goods. Indeed, the past 2000 years reveal a fairly close correspondence between the global centers of economic activity and the centers of intellectual production. Most tellingly, Europe becomes the principle locus of philosophical and scientific activity only when it comes to dominate the global economy through the conquest of the New World and the consequent shifting of the economic center of the world from Asia to Europe.

It is no secret that the center is shifting once again, this time toward the Pacific. A bit of historical perspective makes it easy to see that this shift will have consequences for our understanding of what philosophy is, and of who gets to define the set of questions with which it is concerned.

The West has an extremely rich philosophical tradition — one of the two or three richest, in fact — and it is eminently worthy of preservation and transmission to future generations. But its richness has always been a result of its place as a node in a global network through which ideas and things are always flowing. This was true in 500 B.C. and is no less true today. Increasingly, moreover, this interconnectedness is something that is not only of interest to the antiquarian trivia collector who can’t wait to tell you where the printing press really comes from. It is fast becoming the defining fact about our geopolitcal reality. In this reality, Western academic philosophy will likely come to appear utterly parochial in the coming years if it does not find a way to approach non-Western traditions that is much more rigorous and respectful than the tokenism that reigns at present.


Justin E. H. Smith

Justin E. H. Smith teaches philosophy at Concordia University in Montreal. His most recent book is “Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life.” He is a contributing editor of Cabinet Magazine, and writes regularly on his blog.

NYT

Queen Elizabeth Jubilee Celebration Under Way - NYTimes.com

Queen Elizabeth Jubilee Celebration Under Way - NYTimes.com:

"“We are a nation of Elizabethans,” The Sunday Times said in an editorial. “Although most have never met her, or even seen her in the flesh, it is genuinely hard to imagine life without her.”"

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Robert Fisk: Mubarak will die in jail, but that's no thanks to us - Robert Fisk - Commentators - The Independent

Robert Fisk: Mubarak will die in jail, but that's no thanks to us - Robert Fisk - Commentators - The Independent:

"The dictator was sentenced to death yesterday. Twenty-five years is death, isn't it, if you're 84 years old? Hosni Mubarak will die in jail. And Habib al-Adli, his interior minister, 74 years old, maybe he will be killed in jail if he doesn't live out his life sentence. These were the thoughts of two old Egyptian friends of mine yesterday. And Mubarak was sentenced for the dead of the 2011 revolution. That's 850 dead – 34 people for each year of his term. Quite a thought."

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Saturday, June 02, 2012

Florida Versus Spain - NYTimes.com

Florida Versus Spain - NYTimes.com:

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Catastrophic Credibility - NYTimes.com

Catastrophic Credibility - NYTimes.com:

 "The Fed has conveyed a milder form of the same message, issuing forecasts that show inflation slightly below target and unemployment far above target; given its dual mandate, this should be a flashing siren calling for more action. Yet these forecasts have been accompanied by statements to the effect that no action is currently called for. The Fed has therefore created the credible expectation that it will move only if inflation is far below the claimed target, and doesn’t really care about unemployment."

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Greek Leftist Challenges Europe on Austerity - NYTimes.com

Greek Leftist Challenges Europe on Austerity - NYTimes.com:

 "Measures imposed by the troika, including a 22 percent reduction to the minimum monthly wage of 751 euros, or about $930, and the abolition of collective labor contracts, would be revoked, Mr. Tsipras said. And a moratorium would be imposed on the repayment of Greece’s debt and interest payments until growth is restored. He pledged to stabilize public spending at 43 percent of gross domestic product — below the euro zone average of 46 percent but above the 37 percent demanded by creditors — to raise revenue by taxing the wealthy, to abolish dozens of tax breaks, and to scale back the value-added tax, which falls disproportionately on the poor. “We must stop taxing poverty in this country and start taxing the wealthy who evade tax,” he said."

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The Cowardice of Tyrants

Read below the news on Mubarak's sentencing.

Hosni Mubarak Sentenced to Life Term by Egyptian Court - NYTimes.com

Hosni Mubarak Sentenced to Life Term by Egyptian Court - NYTimes.com:

 "The Associated Press reported Egyptian security officials as saying that Mr. Mubarak resisted leaving the helicopter that flew him to a prison hospital after sentencing. The officials say Mr. Mubarak was tearful as he pleaded with officials to take him back to the military hospital where he had been staying. The A.P. reported that it took 30 minutes to persuade him to leave the aircraft and enter the prison hospital."

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Friday, June 01, 2012

Do-It-Yourself Immigration Reform

IN the noisy American debate over immigration reform, something important seems to have escaped notice: time, and common-sense decisions by Mexican migrants, have brought us nearly everything immigration reform was supposed to achieve.

Migration between Mexico and the United States has returned to a healthy circular pattern: large numbers of Mexicans legally cross northward to work, then return south with confidence that they can repeat the journey the next time. The reason: Even as illegal Mexican migration flattened out in recent years, legal Mexican travel north rose.

These migrants have their papers in order. So it’s time to reconsider whether the United States still faces a difficult problem with Mexican immigration.

There are many reasons illegal Mexican migration has flattened out. The costs and risks have risen. Demand for labor in the United States has fallen. Growth in Mexico’s labor force has slowed.

Yes, the undocumented population in the United States is still about 11.5 million people, about 60 percent of whom are from Mexico, according to the federal Office of Immigration Statistics. But the number is not growing. In fact, data from the Mexican Migration Project, a binational effort by demographers and other researchers, indicates that the rate of undocumented emigration is nearing zero. It peaked at about 55 of every 1,000 Mexican men in 1999; by 2010 it had fallen to 9 per 1,000, a rate not seen since the 1960s.

Meanwhile legal migration soared: 517,000 Mexicans entered the United States as legal temporary workers in 2010, while 888,000 entered on business visas and 30,000 arrived as exchange visitors. In 1995 the respective figures were 27,000, 256,000 and 5,000. In other words, Mexicans are coming to the United States to work as eagerly as ever, but they are doing so legally.

At the same time, legal permanent Mexican immigration to the United States has exploded, with an average of 160,000 persons entering annually since 2005. About 60 percent of those are immediate relatives — spouses, minor children, parents — of American citizens, and an additional 30 percent are other relatives, like siblings.

The large number of family migrants is an unintended, even ironic, consequence of actions taken by Congress and successive administrations to make life miserable for immigrants regardless of legal status. Legislation enacted in 1996 limited access to federal benefits, curtailed civil rights and increased the risk of deportation. The well-being of foreign nationals was further undermined by the USA Patriot Act in 2001 and was threatened in 2006 by the Sensenbrenner bill, which aimed to deter illegal immigration through strict enforcement of draconian new restrictions; it failed to become law, but a similar strategy underlies Arizona’s 2010 anti-illegal-immigration law.

In response, many Mexican permanent residents made an unexpected choice: Rather than leave the United States because they felt unwelcome, they became citizens — a practice known as “defensive naturalization.” In the decade before 1996, an average of 29,000 Mexicans were naturalized each year; since 1996, the average has been 125,000 per year, yielding two million new citizens who could then bring in close relatives. At present, nearly two-thirds of legal permanent residents from Mexico enter as relatives of United States citizens.

Another paradox is that many of these new “permanent residents” do not use the visas to settle in the United States; instead, they circulate back and forth as temporary workers — restoring a pattern that had prevailed until the early 1990s, when the United States began trying to seal the border. When returning periodically to Mexico became too expensive, and running the gantlet to get back into the United States too risky, undocumented migrants and their families simply stayed in the United States.

But now circularity has returned, and with it a need to reconsider immigration reform.

All the major proposals — from Mexico, Congress and President George W. Bush — have included four basic components: reducing illegal immigration; increasing temporary work visas; granting more permanent resident visas; and legalizing existing undocumented migrants. With net migration of undocumented Mexicans near zero and temporary legal migration at record levels, the first two goals have effectively been reached, and mass legal immigration by relatives of citizens satisfies the third.

Regularizing the status of the 11.5 million undocumented people who live in the United States has yet to be accomplished, but a solution can be envisioned by recognizing that self-deportation is not going to happen. Voluntary departures have practically stopped, and the idea of forced removals disturbs many Americans. So if legalization can be achieved without too much fuss, the United States and Mexico will have solved their immigration issue peacefully and quietly.

It’s a solution long in the making, traceable in part to accident and in part to the hypocrisy of an American policy that has quietly legalized temporary workers without saying so publicly. But timeliness and honesty in these matters are often overrated. However we got here, Mexicans and Americans seem to have an opportunity to put their immigration squabble behind them and live more cordially as neighbors.

Jorge G. Castañeda, the foreign minister of Mexico from 2000 to 2003, is a professor of politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University. Douglas S. Massey is a professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton.

A version of this op-ed appeared in print on June 2, 2012, on page A21 of the New York edition with the headline: Do-It-Yourself Immigration Reform.
NYT

Do-It-Yourself Immigration Reform - NYTimes.com

Do-It-Yourself Immigration Reform - NYTimes.com:

 "IN the noisy American debate over immigration reform, something important seems to have escaped notice: time, and common-sense decisions by Mexican migrants, have brought us nearly everything immigration reform was supposed to achieve."

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California Cuts Threaten the Status of Universities

Students at the University of California, Riverside, taking a midterm exam in a psychology class that has an enrollment of 570.

LOS ANGELES — Class sizes have increased, courses have been cut and tuition has been raised — repeatedly. Fewer colleges are offering summer classes. Administrators rely increasingly on higher tuition from out-of-staters. And there are signs it could get worse: If a tax increase proposed by Gov. Jerry Brown is not approved this year, officials say they will be forced to consider draconian cuts like eliminating entire schools or programs.

For generations, the University of California system — home to such globally renowned institutions as Berkeley and U.C.L.A. — has been widely recognized as perhaps the best example of what public universities could be. Along with the California State University system and the state’s vast number of community colleges, higher education options here have long been the envy of other states.

But after years, and even decades, of budget cutbacks from the state, that reputation is under increasing threat. University leaders, who had responded typically to earlier budget cuts with assurances that their institutions were still in top form, now are sounding the alarm. In trying to rally support, they openly worry that their schools do not offer the same quality of education as a decade ago.

“I’d be lying if I said what we offer students hasn’t been changed and that there hasn’t been a degradation of the learning environment,” said Timothy White, the chancellor of the University of California, Riverside, which has had record growth in recent years. Last year, plans to open a medical school on the campus were shelved after state budget cuts.

While there are more students than ever, the number of academic advisers has dropped to 300, from 500 a few years ago, for more than 18,000 undergraduates. Courses that used to require four writing assignments now demand half that because professors have fewer assistants to help them with grading papers, something other campuses have implemented as well.

While no one is arguing that cutting higher education spending is a good thing, some say that the state budget crisis makes it necessary — and may provide an opportunity for needed changes.

Jon Coupal, the president of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, which strongly opposes the proposed tax increase, said the colleges should do more to show they are cutting spending, like reducing pay for top administrators or closing programs that do not directly benefit the state.

“We’ve had the luxury in prior years of heavily subsidizing colleges,” Mr. Coupal said. “But like anything in California, the delivery of higher education is not performance based. They’ve created new campuses and programs based on politics and not need.”

Chancellor White and others say the concerns about the budget cuts are beyond academic. For generations, the universities have been economic engines for the state, graduating hundreds of thousands of students each year. At every level, the universities are receiving more applicants than ever. But without more state money, colleges are struggling to find room for eligible students.

Nathan Brostrom, executive vice president of business operations for the University of California, said the system was now in the middle of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In the last year, the state has cut $750 million from the system’s budget. This year, for the first time, the system receives more money from tuition than from state aid — but that only makes up for roughly a quarter of the cuts from the state. Over all, the budget is the same as it was in 2007, when there were 75,000 fewer students enrolled.

In recent years, many campuses have made a more concerted effort to recruit out-of-state students, who pay more in tuition. But some have criticized the practice, and last month one state lawmaker introduced legislation to cap the number of out-of-state students.

Part of the problem, officials say, is that the amount of money provided by the state has been unpredictable, making long-term planning difficult.

“If we don’t get some kind of change this year, we are going to have an immediate unfathomable situation that really has the potential to completely change the university,” Mr. Brostrom said.

The University of California system is made up of 10 campuses, including Berkeley and U.C.L.A., both ranked by U.S. News in the top 25 of all national universities, public or private. The California State University system, with lower tuition and easier admission requirements, is even larger, with 23 campuses and roughly 425,000 students.

Now, all but seven of the Cal State campuses are considered “impacted,” which means they have stricter admission criteria for applicants applying from outside the immediate area. Five years ago, only five campuses held such a distinction. Many students who attend Cal State campuses live at home to save money, which often means that if they are unable to attend a campus within driving distance they will not enroll.

The financial picture will grow even more dire if the tax increase backed by Governor Brown does not pass in November. The president of the University of California and the chancellor of California State University are both urging voters to approve the increase, saying that any more cuts would mean irreparable harm.

As it stands, community colleges will not receive the same level of financing as they did in 2007 until 2014. If voters approve the governor’s tax proposal, they stand to receive $300 million more this year, but they will lose another $300 million if the tax increase is rejected.

“We just have to get behind this initiative,” Jack Scott, the community colleges chancellor who is retiring this year, urged his colleagues in a conference call last month. “This is no time to quibble about whether the governor’s initiative is exactly what it ought to be or that you would change it here and there.”

In the last rounds of cuts, “campuses have tightened their belts so much that there is no more tightening to be done,” said Lawrence Pitts, academic provost for the University of California. Already, he said, the system is “certainly not providing the nature of education that we have in the past, in terms of breadth and depth, and that is something that has us terribly concerned.”

Another cut would mean contemplating things that have long been sacrosanct, like shuttering departments or eliminating an engineering school from one campus. “Nobody wants to think about those things, but we’re beyond the point of finding efficiencies to make up for the losses,” Mr. Pitts said.

While poor students are still able to obtain financial aid, tuition increases mean that the state’s colleges may no longer be the best choice for the middle class, said Lt. Gov. Gavin Newsom, who is on the board of trustees for the U.C. and Cal State systems. “This is the code red we’re in,” he said. “We’re not cutting into muscle or tissue, we’re cutting into artery.”

In one recent meeting about the Cal State budget, Mr. Newsom said, some raised the possibility of shutting down a campus, saying it could save anywhere between $44 million and $134 million, but the idea was quickly dismissed. The system has had to cap enrollment numbers statewide to deal with the cuts.

“We’re not replacing library books, we’re not providing the kinds of student services that we need to, we’re not providing the kind of health care that we need to,” said Charles B. Reed, the chancellor of the Cal State system who recently announced his retirement. “This is supposed to be our work force for the state. We go down this road and we’re looking at an ugly Russian winter for the economy.”

A version of this article appeared in print on June 2, 2012, on page A14 of the New York edition with the headline: CALIFORNIA CUTS THREATEN STATUS OF UNIVERSITIES.
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