MOSCOW
— Donald J. Trump’s shocking triumph in the American presidential
election will have some unusual foreign-policy repercussions. During the
campaign, Democrats frequently tried to damage Mr. Trump’s standing by
claiming that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia was working for and
supporting the Republican nominee. Now many may believe that America’s
huge political upset could even be described as a victory for the
Kremlin.
In
fact, the idea peddled by American news media that Mr. Putin supports
Mr. Trump is far removed from reality. Proponents of this idea have
blithely ignored the assessments in mainstream Russian news media and by
Russian analysts, which have never been particularly enthusiastic about
Mr. Trump.
There is a lot of concern in Russia about what will happen to American foreign policy once Mr. Trump is inaugurated.
The
main problem with Mr. Trump is that no one — including the
president-elect himself — seems to know what he will do as president,
especially in the area of foreign policy. His statements on foreign
relations so far have been confusing and, at times, contradictory. His
aides and advisers also appear to have a broad range of conflicting
views on America’s foreign and defense policy.
What
is more, Mr. Trump will have to find an accommodation with the
Republican Party establishment. His administration’s foreign-policy and
defense appointments may well become a bargaining chip in that difficult
process. As a result, some very unexpected figures, including outspoken
hawks, may be put at the helm of the State Department and the Pentagon.
Mr. Trump’s own apparent preference is to focus on domestic matters,
especially the economy, so he may yet delegate foreign policy and
defense to the established Republican elite, which is clearly hostile to
Russia.
Considering
all of this, no one in the Kremlin, where people closely follow
American politics and intelligence reports, would seriously consider
betting on Mr. Trump.
Unlike
much of the American and international news media, Russian analysts and
commentators have never underestimated Mr. Trump. Even though he was
sometimes compared to Vladimir Zhironovsky, a flamboyant and outspoken
Russian populist, Mr. Trump was more often viewed as a strong and
charismatic right-of-center leader. Some Russian commentators even
reckon he may more resemble Ronald Reagan — a successful president
pursuing a tough unilateral line on foreign and domestic policy.
In
the longer term, however, Moscow can take comfort from some trends in
American politics that have been put into stark relief throughout 2016.
On foreign policy, both Mr. Trump’s campaign and Bernie Sanders’s
Democratic primary bid highlighted a renewed American proclivity toward
isolationism. Large segments of the American public are tired of endless
military campaigns in the Middle East, and weary of the burden of
America’s foreign commitments.
Even
more important, it has become clear over the past two decades that
globalization has not been such an unalloyed boon for the United States
as some wish to portray it. In fact, it is the industrial heartland of
America that has borne the brunt of the displacement caused by the
breakneck globalization advocated by the Washington elite.
The
key question now is whether America’s nascent isolationism will
translate into policy. Even if it does, it won’t happen soon. The
American political elite remains almost universally interventionist and
supportive of globalization.
In
the meantime, as Russia tries to figure out what to expect from the
Trump presidency, it has very little reason to hope that the new
president will offer any major concessions or strike any major deals
with Moscow, regardless of what he said during the campaign. And Moscow
has very little to offer to Washington at the moment. There are few
areas for possible cooperation. Even if Mr. Trump does want to improve
relations with Russia, he will find out when he moves into the Oval
Office that the United States has little to gain from such an
improvement.
This
is why there is no reason to expect — either now, or in the foreseeable
future — that America and Russia will strike some grand deal to divide
the world into spheres of influence. Even more modest compromises seem
unlikely. The Trump administration will have no incentive to make
overtures to Moscow, such as taking a softer stance on Ukraine or easing
the sanctions on Russia. Besides, for Mr. Trump any softening toward
Russia would face opposition from within the Republican Party and in the
American foreign policy and defense communities. The new president is
unlikely to be willing to pay the steep domestic political price,
especially since improving relations offers no tangible benefits to
America.
The
basic problems in Russian-American relations stem from Moscow’s
fundamental aspiration to return to the global arena as a great power,
and even to contemplate integration into the American-led, pro-Western
world order only on the condition of being recognized as a great power
that dominates most of its former Soviet neighbors. These Russian
aspirations will remain unacceptable to any American administration for
years, if not decades, to come.
There’s only one way this could change, though it is a scenario that many Americans may find uncomfortable to contemplate.
In
the event of further major deterioration of America’s positions in the
global arena — for example, if the United States is dragged into a
confrontation with China while remaining mired in the Middle East —
Russia may look like a more appealing ally, or at least a less appealing
adversary. A confrontation with China, and other foreign-policy
complications, might force Washington to seek a rapprochement with
Russia, in the same way that rivalry with Germany had once forced the
British Empire to put aside its longstanding differences with Russia and
sign a pact in 1907. But for this scenario to come to pass, Moscow will
have to remain firm and unyielding for as long as it takes.
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